The Shoplifting Problem in Pennsylvania by unknown
Volume 61 
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 61, 
1956-1957 
3-1-1957 
The Shoplifting Problem in Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra 
Recommended Citation 
The Shoplifting Problem in Pennsylvania, 61 DICK. L. REV. 255 (1957). 
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol61/iss3/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more 
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
THE SHOPLIFTING PROBLEM IN PENNSYLVANIA
U NDER the auspices of the Pennsylvania Retailers' Association, a group of
students * drawn from the staff of the DICKINSON LAW REVIEW, under
faculty supervision,** undertook a study to determine the nature of the shop-
lifting I problem in Pennsylvania and what effective measures might be pro-
posed to curb it.
The research group, with the aid of a broadly designed questionnaire,
interviewed store managers, protection personnel, and employees in different
types of stores and law enforcement authorities in representative cities and
towns throughout Pennsylvania.'
For practical reasons, interviews were conducted at only a limited number
of different types of stores throughout Pennsylvania.' Included were depart-
ment stores in big and medium-sized cities, variety stores in cities and towns,
smaller department stores in smaller towns, chain stores, super-markets, and
small stores in small towns. Although each store has certain problems pe-
culiar to itself, the common interests shared by these types warrant the as-
sumption that in general a common approach is taken. When a difference
in the type or size of a store indicates that a different approach is taken, that
difference will be noted. Sources will remain anonymous because information
was obtained on that understanding.
In this article, the seriousness of shoplifting to the retailer and the public
will be treated first. The measures the stores take on their own to fight it
will next be considered. Four typical fact situations will present the attitude
of the retailer in fighting shoplifting; included in this will be a discussion
of the bases of his policy. The present law on the subject will then be ana-
lyzed to test its adequacy in the light of the preceding background. Finally,
a proposed statute will be submitted as a suggested measure to curb shop-
lifting.
* The student group was composed of Maxwell E. Davison, Articles Editor, A.B., Lafayette,
1954; Robert J. Key, Research Editor, A.B., Dickinson College, 1955; and Henry J. Rutherford,
Editor-in-Chief, A.B., Dickinson College, 1955.
* * Director of the Faculty Committee was Mr. Edgar R. Casper, Assistant Professor of Law,
LL.B., 1947, LL.M., 1948, University of London; LL.M., 1954, Harvard University. Mr. Clinton
R. Weidner, Adjunct Assistant Professor of Law, Ph.B., 1937, Dickinson College; LL.B., 1939,
Dickinson School of Law; and Mr. F. Eugene Reader, Professor of Law, A.B., 1928, College of
Wooster; LL.B., 1931, University of Pennsylvania, were the other members of the committee.
1 For the purposes of this study, shoplifting is the theft, by a non-employee, of goods dis-
played for sale in a store during store hours.
2 The information obtained was used to determine the attitudes of personnel in daily contact
with the problem and did not serve as an exclusive source of facts.
3 The selection of stores within each type was random, tempered by convenience in terms of
availability of the store staff for interviewing purposes.
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I. NATURE AND EFFECTS OF SHOPLIFTING
Management generally considered shoplifting a problem. Comparing it
with other problems related to their business, they characterized it with vary-
ing degrees of emphasis, some calling it "major", "serious", or "great", while
others termed it a "problem". Its effects were felt most keenly by the de-
partment and variety stores and by the super-markets.
Management interviewed attributed approximately one-half to 1% of total
shrinkage to shoplifting.4 The Controllers' Congress of the National Retail
Dry Goods Association estimates that stock shortages in department stores
are approximately 1% of sales.' The loss in variety stores may run more
than 1% because of their open displays of merchandise, and in some variety
stores this figure may be as high as 3%.' The Wall Street journal for Octo-
ber 31 of 1956 estimates annual shoplifting losses to retailers all over the
United States at $100,000,000. Other sources put the national figure at
$250,000,000 annually.7  The United States Census of Business for 1954, the
most recent and authoritative source of information on retail sales in Penn-
sylvania, listed the combined sales of department and variety stores in Penn-
sylvania at $1,259,094,000 for that year.8 At the rate of one-half of 1%, the
total loss caused by shoplifting in Pennsylvania department and variety stores
is at least $6,250,000 annually, and at the rate of 1% given by some stores,
the shoplifting loss in this segment of the retail trade may be $12,500,000
annually.
Shoplifting, of course, is not confined to the department and variety
stores but is also widely practiced in retail food stores, apparel stores, jewelry
stores, etc. If a conservative rate of one-fifth of 1% is used, this fraction
would still point up a loss of over $10,000,000 annually. With the addition
of the above figures for department and variety stores, Pennsylvania retail
stores suffer a total loss of $16,000,000 or more a year from shoplifting.
As a cross-check on the accuracy of these estimated losses, another com-
parison can be made by referring to estimates of the extent of shoplifting
4 From the standpoint of scientific preciseness, it is impossible to segregate shoplifting as a
cause of loss from other causes like employee dishonesty and breakage. To arrive at this estimate,
most stores used their business judgment and experience. Others measured their shoplifting losses
by the number of apprehensions made and by Uniform Crime Statistics. This estimate may be high
because other possible causes were not segregated and because of the reluctance to attribute losses
to employee dishonesty. The national statistics mentioned in the text may also have influenced
this figure.
5 Information obtained from Pennsylvania Retailers' Association.
6 Information obtained from Pennsylvania Retailers' Association.
7 These sources can be obtained from the Pennsylvania Retailers' Association, 416-418 Fulton
Bank Building, Lancaster, Pa.
8 See January, 1956 report on "1954 Census of Business, Retail Trade," Series PR-1-38, Penn-
sylvania report, United States Department of Commerce.
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losses over the United States. These estimates, as stated previously, range
from a minimum of $100,000,000 to as high as $250,000,000 in annual losses.
Since Pennsylvania retail sales make up approximately 7%9 of the national
total, then, according to the national estimates, Pennsylvania shoplifting losses
would range from $7,000,000 to $17,000,000 per year.
These figures are not static but seem to be increasing. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, there were 28,266 known offenses committed
at retail counters in the 433 cities it checked during 1955, indicating an in-
crease of 4.4% from 1954.1"
Law enforcement authorities also consider shoplifting a major problem.
One city police force, for example, has assigned a special full-time plain-
clothes squad to detect shoplifting in its downtown shopping district. Cities
without special shoplifting squads assign plainclothesmen to patrol the stores
at certain times. This special police protection is, of course, added to the bur-
den of the taxpayer.
Since many shoplifting losses are irrecoverable because the thief, unde-
tected, gets away with the merchandise, almost all stores must reflect this loss
in the form of higher prices. No store can obtain effective insurance coverage
on shoplifting losses because of the impossibility of specifically attributing a
loss to shoplifting itself.1
The character of particular types of shoplifters constitutes major factors
in the social effects of this crime. Many dope addicts become "professionals"
in this area; they sell the stolen merchandise to fences in order to obtain
money for their dope.'" This practice has resulted in large shoplifting rings
which are not confined to the larger cities but expand their scope of operation
to small towns as well in order to avoid detection. It has been suggested that
one of the most tragic effects of shoplifting is that it provides an introduc-
tion to crime for the young criminal. It is here where he first learns to be
dishonest and develops a criminal frame of mind. As a crime expert in one
city stated, "Shoplifting is Class A Ball for the major leagues of crime."
II. MEASURES STORES TAKE TO FIGHT SHOPLIFTING
In their fight against shoplifting the stores have on their own initiative
adopted certain protective measures. Some use one-way windows or alarm sig-
nals when a suspect is spotted, but on the whole mechanical devices do not
" See 1954 Census of Business, note 8 supra.
10 Wall Street Journal, Oct. 31, 1956.
11 Because a shoplifting loss cannot be proved specifically, a claim for loss on a theft insur-
ance policy cannot be made. Burglary policies also do not cover this loss.
12 Information obtained from crime expert who wishes to remain anonymous. See also 62
YALE L. J. 788 (1952-53).
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figure greatly in protection plans because they are not considered sufficiently
effective to warrant the expense.
The use of personnel is the most effective protection measure the stores
have. These personnel can be categorized as special protection personnel
(e.g., the familiar "store detective"), personnel of comparatively high au-
thority (e.g., floorwalkers and department supervisors), 18 and ordinary sales
clerks. Only the larger stores can afford the special protection personnel;
some stores able to afford this expense do not do so because they believe that
their physical lay-out is such that this expense is not necessary. Those stores
without special protection personnel include the detection of shoplifting
among the duties of their floor and department supervisors. The ordinary
sales clerk, although he is not permitted to apprehend a suspect, is instructed
to be watchful for shoplifters and to report suspicious activities to authorized
personnel.
Personnel training programs vary from store to store. All stores instruct
their employees as to policy on observation, reporting, and apprehension of
suspects. Different methods are employed, however, in training special per-
sonnel. For example, in one city the District Attorney's Office gives lectures
and conducts seminars on crime prevention and enforcement, how to obtain
evidence, what is relevant, etc. One store includes all aspects of retailership
in its training program. Another store has a meeting of all its employees,
including the sales force, once a week to discuss shoplifting and related prob-
lems. Almost all stores with a special staff employ former police officers to
head the staff in order to obtain the advantages of their experience; and these
managers or supervisors in turn give their subordinates additional training.
Those stores unable to afford a security force, or who do not think such neces-
sary, seldom have special training programs for their employees. Any training
they have is far less concentrated than that of the large stores and consists
primarily of lectures or on-the-job instructions. In effect, the only training
employees in small stores receive is what experience teaches them.'"
Some stores without a special security force employ independent protec-
tion services and detective agencies to assist them in this area. Whether these
"outside" organizations will be used depends on cost and seasonal factors.
13 The functions of authorized personnel generally are not limited to the detection of shoplift-
ing alone but also extend to guarding against employee dishonesty and the investigation of "bad
checks." The activities of these classes of personnel are not carried on independently of one an-
other; in many areas their activities overlap, and these personnel work in close cooperation with
each other.
14As an additional safeguard, one store offers for the apprehension of shoplifters a reward
of 10% of the price of the merchandise taken or $5.00, whichever is greater. This store reported
that during 1955 it regained as much as $7,000 in goods and estimated that it paid out from $500
to $600 a year in rewards.
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Some, for example, use them only during the holiday rushes, and others have
them watch the stores just a few times a week.
Almost all the stores rated cooperation from the police as very good. As
pointed out previously, in some localities plainclothesmen patrol the stores at
various times; police help is usually asked for most frequently during the
Christmas season and during periods of unemployment. In addition to this
active assistance, police conduct clinics to train store employees in guarding
against shoplifting.
Retail associations and individual stores have prepared and distributed
pamphlets and booklets designed to educate both the stores and the general
public on the techniques of the shoplifter and ways to stop him. These groups,
sometimes in cooperation with law enforcement authorities, also conduct crime-
prevention clinics.
In the self-protection area, the small retailer's problem is especially acute.
He cannot afford to hire either special detectives or the "outside" services. As
a result, he must entrust the detection of shoplifting to his employees, who are
usually very inexperienced in this field. Moreover, since he or his chief clerk
is so busy attending to other details that they cannot properly observe a sus-
pect, much shoplifting in the small stores goes undetected.
III. APPREHENSION AND RECAPTION
The principal factors deterring apprehension of suspected shoplifters are
the good will of the store and the fear of being sued in case of a mistake. The
nature of this problem can be presented in the context of four typical fact
situations. The order of presentation proceeds from that set of facts where an
apprehension will most likely be made to the troublesome intermediate areas
of doubt. Each set of facts will be analyzed in terms of what the stores do
and also in terms of the reasons for adopting each course of action.
No. 1. An authorized person (a specially trained store detective or a
supervisor) sees a "customer" take an article displayed for sale and concludes
that he does not intend to pay for it.
No. 2. An ordinary sales clerk sees a "customer" take an article displayed
for sale and concludes that he does not intend to pay for it.
No. 3. An authorized person without observing the taking of an article
suspects that a "customer" has stolen an article displayed for sale.
No. 4. An ordinary sales clerk without observing the taking of an article
suspects that a "customer" has stolen an article displayed for sale.
1957.]
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In No. 1 an apprehension usually will be made. Actual apprehension
procedure varies from store to store. Some stores will follow the thief until
he leaves the premises. Other stores wait until he leaves the particular de-
partment or floor from which he has taken the merchandise. The reason for
waiting until the suspect takes some definite action is that an apprehension
on the spot gives him the opportunity to answer that he was going to pay for
the article at the next counter, or compare it with an article in another part
of the store, or wait until he gathered together everything he wanted before
paying for it.'5 Especially vexatious to security personnel is the peripatetic
and meticulous woman shopper who may want to take a hat to the umbrella
department in order to compare the color of the two.
In No. 2 the sales clerk is instructed to notify an authorized person im-
mediately; he may not make an apprehension on his own. The authorized
person will then follow the suspect to see whether other thefts will be made,
but he may not apprehend the suspect on the word of the sales clerk alone.
The authorized person must actually see the item taken.
No. 3 is the real danger area, and the same procedure as in No. 2 will
be followed. Where the taking itself is merely suspected, apprehension is
not warranted.
In No. 4 the sales clerk is again instructed to notify an authorized per-
son immediately, and the procedure in No. 2 is again followed.
The natural consequence of the policy in situations 2, 3, and 4 is that many
shoplifters escape with impunity.
(a) Bases of Policy
Reluctance to apprehend is based on the fear of losing good will and on
the fear of being sued for false imprisonment."' 1a
Many stores consider their good will too precious to risk in doubtful situ-
ations. If an innocent customer is stopped, his indignation and the resultant
unfavorable remarks he is likely to make about the store can easily cause sales
volume to drop. The good will motivation is not confined to any one type of
store; it is a valuation running through the policy of all stores. Even though
15 This may also be strong evidence if prosecution is decided upon. See infra.
16 Both the good will and tort liability fears are very important, but they cannot be distin-
guished from the standpoint of which of the two is proportionately stronger. Some stores referred
to good will alone and said that no change in the law would cause any difference in their activities.
l6a Management and protection managers drew a distinction between false arrest and false
imprisonment. However, there is no distinction in law concerning the purposes for which one is




it cannot be accurately predicted what actions will impair good will and to
what extent, the fear of losing it may prevent apprehension even in a situa-
tion so clear-cut as that presented in the first set of facts above. One store,
for example, stated that it would rather lose $10.00 in goods than offend a
customer even if he is also a thief. If a store is reputed to push its customers
around, it may lose business. The fact that there is no justification for such
a reputation is not sufficient when balanced against the risk, however slight,
of losing customers.
The retailers, both large and small, in the small towns and the chain
stores in the neighborhoods frequently find that their fear of losing good will
confronts them with a dilemma. Since in the smaller localities most families
often deal with only one merchant for certain things, offending a customer
may lead to the loss of his or his family's account. The result is that the store-
keeper does not want to risk the good will of the shoplifter himself! "
The stores' fear of being sued for false imprisonment was frequently ex-
pressed to consist not only for a fear of incurring tort liability but also of ad-
verse publicity resulting from having their name "dragged through the courts."
(b) Detention
After an apprehension, the store must decide what to do with the thief.
All stores will try to recover the stolen merchandise. Most of them will ask
the thief to pay for it. Whether he will be detained for questioning depends
on the circumstances of each case. The value of the items taken, the type of
the items, and the thief's apparent character are the determining factors. One
store, for example, usually detains a shoplifter who has taken items totalling
at least $15.00. The questioning takes place in the protection manager's office
or, if there is no security force, in the office of someone with authority. Every
effort is made to avoid a scene and to get away from other customers as soon
as possible. The purpose of the questioning is mainly to decide whether to
prosecute or to try to "rehabilitate" the thief. Records, if available, are
checked to learn whether he is a first offender. He may also be given a con-
fession (on a mimeographed form prepared in advance) to sign, and some
stores also have him sign a release of any tort claims. One store even takes
the precaution of having someone from the front office witness the signing
of the confession and release for the reason that he may be a more credible
witness in the event of a trial. Some stores, however, will not take the sus-
pect to an office for questioning, and others will not touch him in any way.
These stores detain him only for the purpose of handing him over to the police.
17 A food store in a small town and a variety neighborhood store in a large city said that they




Whether a store will prosecute depends on the merits of each case. If
the goods taken are more than $20.00 or $30.00, most stores will prosecute.
But if the thief appears to be a first offender, he will not be prosecuted in
most cases. Rehabilitation is usually attempted in the case of a youthful shop-
lifter by pointing out the consequences of his behavior. His parents or
preacher, or sometimes when a married person is involved, his spouse, will be
contacted. One store turns him over to the juvenile authorities if he lives in
a questionable neighborhood.
Many stores feel that present judicial machinery hinders them in prose-
cution. The backlogs in the trial lists and what they consider the slowness
in court proceedings mean that their merchandise will be tied up as exhibits
and their personnel tied up as witnesses. They also fear that a defendant may
be able to play on the sympathy of a jury in the role of a "little man" against
a corporation. It is possible that long range protection of stores may only
be achieved by stricter enforcement of the criminal law. But the immediate
protection of stores is found not in a reform of the criminal law but in pro-
tection from tort liability.
IV. TORT AND CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The fear of being sued for false imprisonment is a principal determinant
of store policy concerning the apprehension of suspected shoplifters. This
fear is based on advice received from attorneys, experience, and general beliefs.
A peace officer unquestionably has the power to apprehend without a war-
rant where he reasonably suspects that a felony "8 has been committed and
also reasonably suspects that the person apprehended has committed that fel-
ony.'9 A private person has the power to apprehend without a warrant where
a felony has actually been committed and where he reasonably suspects that
the person he has apprehended has committed that felony." It is, however,
exceedingly doubtful whether under Pennsylvania law a private person has
the same power to apprehend without a warrant as a police officer.21
At common law a private citizen was liable for false imprisonment if he
apprehended another in the absence of the actual commission of a felony no
matter how reasonable his suspicions were. Probable cause for believing
18 Shoplifting is a species of larceny, and larceny is a felony in Pennsylvania. Act of June
24, 1939, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4807 (Purdon).
19 Brooks and Orme v. Com., 61 Pa. 352, 100 Am. Dec. 645 (1869).2 0 McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881).
21 Although it is not clear, it seems that a private person does not have such power. See
Wakely v. Hart, 6 Binn. 316 (1814).2 2
Dicta in Russel v. Shuster, 8 W. & S. 308 (1844); Mahaffey v. Byers, 151 Pa. 92, 25 Atf.
93 (1892); Grohman v. Kirschman, 168 Pa. 189, 32 AtI. 32 (1895), but here the action seems
to be for malicious prosecution; Wilson v. Emery, 1 Pa. D. & C. 517 (1920).
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that a felony had actually been committed was no defense.2 1 Whether Penn-
sylvania follows this rule is, as previously mentioned, not clear. The mere
apprehension of another exposes the person apprehending to the risk of lia-
bility for false imprisonment. 4 But apprehension followed by prosecution
exposes the prosecutor to the further risk of liability for malicious prosecution
or abuse of process. 5
Probable cause is unquestionably a defense in an action for malicious
prosecution, but in some cases where apprehension was followed by prosecu-
tion some Pennsylvania decisions have stated that probable cause is a defense
to false imprisonment.2
In some cases where apprehension was followed by prosecution and the
plaintiff brought an action for false imprisonment, some Pennsylvania deci-
sions have stated that probable cause is a defense.2 If in fact it is the law
that probable cause is always a defense in an action for false imprisonment,
the fears of the stores would be groundless because, in effect, the power of
a private person to apprehend would be the same as that of a peace officer.
On one ground or another, however, these cases can be distinguished and
should not be considered binding authority on this precise question. In
McCarthy v. DeArmit, a felony had actually been committed; here a private
person may arrest.2 " In others, legal machinery had been employed; in sub-
stance, these cases must thus be examined by malicious prosecution principles."
Others involved peace officers whose power to arrest on probable cause alone
is unquestionable.20
There are a few cases where this problem was closely approached, but
it was not precisely decided. In Cohen v. Lit Brothers,"' a store detective de-
tained a suspect where shoplifting had not actually been committed; the facts
thus seem to put it squarely within false imprisonment principles. The court
stated that whether the facts gave rise to probable cause is a question of law
for the court to decide; the opinion then continued with this interesting lan-
guage: ". . . and upon this point there is no difference, in principle, between
23 See note 22 supra.
2 4 McAleer v. Good, 216 Pa. 473, 65 At. 934, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 383 (1907).
2
5 Emerson v. Cochran, 17 W.N.C. 210 (1886); Mihalyik v. Klein, 22 Pa. Super. 195 (1903),
which was labeled an action for false arrest and false imprisonment, but which seems really to be
abuse of process.
26 Neall v. Hart, 115 Pa. 347, 8 Atl. 628 (1885), which, although labeled an action for false
imprisonment, seems to be an action for malicious prosecution.
27 Levitz v. Raum, 59 Pa. Super. 260 (1915); O'Donnel v. Rowe, 16 D. & C. 212 (1929).
2899 Pa. 63 (1881).
2 Levitz v. Raum, 59 Pa. Super. 260 (1915); Nikeberg v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co.,
16 Pa. Dist. Rep. 906 (1907).
30 McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881); Russel v. Shuster, 8 W. & S. 308 (1844); Harris
v. Bennet, 1 Phila. 175 (1851).
21 166 Pa. Super. 429, 71 A.2d 818 (1950).
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an action for false imprisonment and one for malicious prosecution." This
language is, however, open to different interpretations. And since the case
was sent back to the lower court for further determination because of a con-
flict in the evidence," these statements are not strong enough to be considered
binding.
In view of the unclarity of these cases coupled with the common belief
among attorneys and law enforcement officers that probable cause is not a de-
fense in an action for false imprisonment by a private person, i.e., that the
power of a private person to apprehend without a warrant is restricted to situ-
ations where a felony has actually been committed, these cases do not justify
the storekeepers' reliance on them.
In addition to false imprisonment, liability for assault and battery may
be imposed where shoplifting has not been committed.8 If accusatory words
are untruthful, a slander action may also lie. 4 Concurrently with these civil
liabilities, the person doing the apprehending may also be criminally liable
for assault and battery " and false imprisonment."
The fears restraining retailers from acting on their own to prevent shop-
lifting are thus justified. The heavy losses and harmful social and moral ef-
fects attributable to this crime demand that the merchant-the person directly
involved and who is in the best position to take corrective action-be given
some power to stop its abuses. Existing law is inadequate. Police forces are
not large enough. And the trend of the cases is not clearly definable. To
fill the void a statute remedying this mischief is needed. Such a statute should
extend the merchant's power of arrest.
The Florida Legislature recognized the gravity of this problem and the
impotence of the retailer in fighting it when it passed a statute enabling a
merchant to reasonably detain a person under suspicious circumstances. It
in effect provides that probable cause alone is sufficient to warrant an arrest;
a felony need not have been actually committed."'
82 There is no further record of the case.
33 Butler v. Stockdale, 19 Pa. Super. 98 (1902).
34 Rhoads v. Anderson, 12 Cent. 727, 10 Sadler 247, 13 Ati. 823 (1888).
85 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4708 (Purdon, 1939), Act of June, 1939, P. L. 872 and 708.
36 Com. v. Brewer, 109 Pa. Super. 429, 167 Ati. 386 (1933).
37 The Florida statute is as follows:
"Section 1. A peace officer, or a merchant, or a merchant's employee who has probable cause
for believing that goods held for sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a person
and that he can recover them by taking the person into custody, may, for the purpose of attempt-
ing to effect such recovery, take the person into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner
for a reasonable length of time. Such taking into custody and detention by a peace officer, mer-
chant, or merchant's employee shall not render such police officer, merchant or merchant's employee
criminally or civilly liable for false arrest, false imprisonment, or unlawful detention.
"Section 2. Any peace officer may arrest without warrant any person he has probable cause
for believing has committed larceny in retail or wholesale establishments.
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In view of the above analysis, there are strong arguments in favor of a
similar statute in Pennsylvania in order to clarify, if not to change, the law.
Certain values must be weighed and balanced against each other.
The individual's interest in his personal liberty must be safeguarded; at
the same time the retailer's interest in protecting his property and the public's
interest in preventing crime must be advanced. The basic purpose of such a
statute must, therefore, be to grant a retailer the power to apprehend suspected
shoplifters on probable cause alone. If his actions are reasonable under the
circumstances, he should be made immune from civil and criminal liability.
The importance of customer good will, as brought out above, should serve
as a check on any abuses of this power. Moreover, an unreasonable use of
this power will remove the shield of immunity from the merchant and make
him responsible in damages to an injured party.
The following statute is proposed as an aid to the prevention of shop-
lifting:
"An Act, Relating to the power to apprehend and to detain for ques-
tioning persons believed to have committed larceny of goods displayed
for sale by a merchant.
"The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
hereby enacts as follows:
"Section 1. A merchant or an employee expressly designated by such
merchant, who has probable cause for believing that goods displayed for
sale by the merchant have been unlawfully taken by a person and that he
can recover them by taking the person into custody, may, for the purpose
of attempting to effect such recovery, use reasonable force to take the per-
son into custody and detain him in a reasonable manner for a reasonable
length of time. Such taking into custody by such merchant or merchant's
employee shall not render such merchant or merchant's employee crimi-
nally or civilly liable.
"Section 2. A charge made to a peace officer by a merchant or said
merchant's designated employee shall constitute a reasonable ground for
the peace officer to arrest the person accused. Such merchant or mer-
chant's employee shall not be criminally or civilly liable for the appre-
hension of any person apprehended under this section where said mer-
chant or merchant's employee had probable cause for charging said per-
son with commission of larceny of goods displayed for sale."
"Section 3. A merchant or a merchant's employee who causes such arrest as provided for in
Section 1 of a person for larceny of goods held for sale shall not be criminally or civilly liable
for false arrest or false imprisonment where the merchant or merchant's employee has probable
cause for believing that the person arrested committed larceny of goods held for sale."
The Florida statute was based on a note by John Waltz in 62 YALE L. J. 788 (1952-53).
1957.1
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Reasonableness is the basic test under this act and is the standard for
executing this power. Specific definitions of the proper amount and degree of
force and of the time period permitted for detention are avoided because it is
felt that any such definite specification would increase rather than decrease
the risk of arbitrariness or injustice in particular cases. Since each fact situa-
tion should be judged on its merits, more just results will be obtained if the
trier of fact is not restricted in his analysis of the facts of the case. Moreover,
any statutory presumptions of reasonableness in certain cases may tend to deny
relief in unusual cases. If an apprehended suspect believes that he has been
unreasonably treated, his opportunity to spell out his grievances in his com-
plaint should be sufficient to protect his rights. The reasonableness standard
coupled with the desire to preserve good will should discourage wanton ap-
prehensions. Admittedly, this standard may expose this statute to a greater
risk of being held unconstitutional than if some more specific standards were
used. But it is felt that in this context this standard is not too vague and that
the rights of the public are sufficiently safeguarded."
The use of the power is specifically restricted to the recaption of mer-
chandise reasonably believed to have been stolen. If a merchant wishes to
turn over a thief to the police he may detain him until the police arrive even
after the goods have been regained. Since this power is given a private per-
son by the common law, it is not necessary to mention it in the statute. " Il-
lustrative of other reasonable acts are the removal of a suspect from the store
proper to a side office in order to avoid disrupting activities in the sales area
and detention for the purpose of ascertaining whether the shoplifter has stolen
other goods or is working with a confederate.
The immunity granted by this statute extends to all civil and criminal lia-
bility. This will prevent the anomalous result obtained under other proposed
statutes where the merchant is immune from false imprisonment but still sub-
ject to assault and battery or slander liability.4
The first sentence of section 2 is intended to resolve all doubt as to whether
it is reasonable for a peace officer to make an arrest solely on the unsworn
words of another.4 Such a provision will facilitate and complete the execu-
58 The standard of reasonableness in the Florida statute, supra note 37, has not been attacked.
There are cases where an even more specific standard has been declared unconstitutional. See, for
example, Hallmark Productions v. Carroll et al., 384 Pa. 348, 121 A.2d 584 (1956).
s See note 27 supra.
4 See §§ I and 3 of the Florida statute in note 37 supra. Immunity is given only from false
imprisonment or false arrest liability.
See also a similar statute proposed in 32 IND. L. J. 20 at 37 (1956). This statute would give
a merchant a privilege to detain reasonably, although nothi ig is said specifically with respect to
immunity from liability.
41 McAleer v. Good, 216 Pa. 473, 65 Atl. 934, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 383 (1907).
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tion of the purpose of this act. The second sentence of section 2 is also de-
signed to cover a doubtful situation."
A recurring objection to a statute like this is that the individual's per-
sonal liberty is not safeguarded. To meet this objection, this power is limited
to a merchant and to the employees he expressly designates to exercise it.
If anyone not within the group to whom the power is given attempts to exer-
cise it, the statute affords him no protection. The merchant's fear of losing
his customer good will is the most powerful restraint imposed on the exercise
of this power to arrest by irresponsible persons.4"
The success of this power in the drive against shoplifting depends on
how the retailers use it. They will now be protected if they make a mistake,
but only if a reasonable man under the same circumstances would probably
also have made this mistake.
It is not this increased power to arrest by itself that will be the main
weapon in this fight. Publicity that the merchants have it and intend to use
it to protect their merchandise should be widespread. The grant of this power
and its attendant publicity should act as a deterrent to the casual and inter-
mittent shoplifters. Moreover, the professional, who has taken advantage of
the apparent common law limitations on the powers of apprehension in the
past, should now be discouraged from plying his trade because he can no longer
rely on a merchant's hesitancy to act.
42 Samuel v. Blackwell, 76 Pa. Super. 540 (1921).
43 See discussion supra of bases of policy.
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